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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
___________ 
 
No. 16-1880 
___________ 
 
 
IN RE: DANA N. GRANT-COVERT, 
      Appellant 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-15-cv-06018) 
District Judge:  Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 1, 2016 
 
Before:  VANASKIE, SCIRICA and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 6, 2016) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Dana N. Grant-Covert appeals from the District Court’s order, which affirmed a 
bankruptcy court order1 that vacated the automatic stay in her bankruptcy proceeding.  
We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 Because the parties are familiar with the history and facts of the case, we will limit 
our discussion to those facts essential to our decision.  Appellant filed a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy proceeding in June of 2015.  Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., claiming to be a 
secured creditor based on a first mortgage on real property, filed a motion for relief from 
the automatic stay, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), in order to foreclose on the real property.  
Grant-Covert opposed the motion, arguing that Wells Fargo was “not the Real Party in 
Interest,” that it did not have standing, that it was a “third Party Interloper,” and that it 
had “not filed a Proof of Claim to be considered as Secured Creditor.”  Bankr. Dkt. #24 at 
2. 
 The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on the motion.  Wells Fargo did not attend.  
The Bankruptcy Judge granted Wells Fargo’s motion, informing Grant-Covert that she 
would have to raise any defenses she had in the state-court foreclosure action.  Grant-
Covert timely appealed. 
 The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court order.  The Court agreed that 
Grant-Covert could raise her defenses to the claim in the foreclosure action, concluded 
that Wells Fargo was a real party in interest under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), and held that 
                                              
1 See In re:  Dana N. Grant-Covert, No. 15-20394-ABA (Bankr. D.N.J. July 22, 2015). 
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Wells Fargo had shown cause for relief from the automatic stay.  Grant-Covert filed a 
timely appeal. 
  The District Court had jurisdiction to review the Bankruptcy Court’s order 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), and we have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s 
order under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s 
determination is plenary, and we use the same standard of review as the District Court in 
reviewing the decision of the Bankruptcy Court.  See Kool, Mann, Coffee & Co. v. 
Coffey, 300 F.3d 340, 353 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 Grant-Covert raises four issues in her brief on appeal, but her argument essentially 
boils down to this:  Wells Fargo could not properly move to lift the stay because it lacked 
standing and/or was not a real party in interest.  The Bankruptcy Court did not address 
the argument, stating that “[t]here’s really no basis for this Court to retain the jurisdiction 
over those issues.”  Tr. at 5.  The District Court did consider the argument, and held that 
Wells Fargo was a real party in interest.  We agree. 
 Constitutional standing is a threshold jurisdictional limitation; federal courts may 
only decide real cases or controversies.  See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 
(1953).  Grant-Covert does not appear to argue that Wells Fargo failed to show 
constitutional standing.  But even if “the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the 
‘case or controversy’ requirement, [the Supreme] Court has held that the plaintiff 
generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief 
on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 
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(1975).  This prudential aspect of standing is closely related to § 362(d)’s requirement 
that the party moving to terminate the automatic stay be “a party in interest.”  Because 
real parties in interest always have standing, but the converse is not always true, we focus 
on whether Wells Fargo is a real party in interest.  See In re Veal, 450 B.R. 897, 907 (9th 
Cir. BAP 2011) (citing 4 Moore’s Fed. Prac. § 17.10[1], at p. 17-15 (3d ed. 2010)2); see 
also In re Miller, 666 F.3d 1255, 1261 (10th Cir. 2012) (party seeking relief under 
§ 362(d) must be either creditor or debtor of bankruptcy estate). 
 Grant-Covert argues that Wells Fargo is not a real party in interest because it did 
not show that it was entitled to enforce the Note associated with her mortgage.  She does 
not dispute that her mortgage was transferred to Wells Fargo, but she argues that it cannot 
show that it was entitled to enforce the associated note because it was “indorsed to Wells 
Fargo and then indorsed in blank.”  Appellant’s Br. at 11, quoting Dist. Ct. Op. at 2.  
 Under New Jersey law, an instrument that is indorsed in blank “becomes payable 
to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone until specially indorsed.”  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:3-205.  Thus, whoever was in possession of the note would become 
the “holder” of the note, and would be entitled to enforce the note under N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 12A:3-301.  And under common law, if Wells Fargo held the mortgage but not the 
underlying note, the mortgage would have been “a worthless piece of paper.”  See Veal, 
450 B.R. at 916 (internal quotation and citation omitted).  Grant-Covert argues that the 
                                              
2 The same concept now appears at 2-13 Moore’s Manual--Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 13.01[1] (2016). 
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reasoning in Veal should persuade us and similarly should result in a finding that Wells 
Fargo did not show that it is a real party in interest.  But we find that unlike in Veal, 
Wells Fargo made a sufficient showing here that it possessed the note as well as the 
mortgage. 
 First, in Veal the assignment of the mortgage did “not contain language effecting 
an assignment of the Note.”  Veal, 450 B.R. at 905.  In contrast, the assignment here 
assigned the mortgage to Wells Fargo “Together with the bond, Note or other Obligation 
therein described, and the money due to grow due thereon, with the interest.”  Bankr. 
Dkt. #18-1 at 22.  Second, Tiffany Pompey, Vice President Loan Documentation of 
Wells Fargo certified that she had personally reviewed the company’s records and 
certified that Wells Fargo “directly or through an agent, has possession of the promissory 
note.”  Id. at 1.  And the certification attached a copy of the Note.  Id. at 11-12.  Cf. Veal, 
450 B.R. at 904 (“Wells Fargo submitted . . . no evidence as to who possessed the Note 
and no evidence regarding any property interest it held in the Note.”); Miller, 666 F.3d at 
1264 (“While Deutsche Bank has offered proof that IndyMac assigned the Note in blank, 
it elicited no proof that Deutsche Bank in fact obtained physical possession of the original 
Note from IndyMac, either voluntarily or otherwise.”). 
 As Wells Fargo provided evidence that it had been assigned the mortgage, and that 
it was in possession of the Note indorsed in blank, it produced sufficient evidence to 
allow the Bankruptcy Court to find that it was a party in interest, entitling it to ask that 
court to lift the automatic stay. 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
